J Popul Econ (2018) 31:627–670
DOI 10.1007/s00148-017-0663-y

ORIGINAL PAPER

The impact of party affiliation of US governors on immigrants' labor market outcomes

Louis-Philippe Beland[1] · **Bulent Unel**[1]

Received: 15 September 2015 / Accepted: 31 July 2017 / Published online: 15 August 2017

Abstract Do immigrants have better labor market outcomes under Democratic governors? By exploiting variations associated with close elections in a regression discontinuity (RD) design applied on gubernatorial elections in 50 states over the last two decades, we find that immigrants are more likely to be employed, work longer hours and more weeks, and have higher earnings under Democratic governors. Results are robust to a number of different specifications, controls, and samples.

Keywords Earning gaps · Immigration · Labor market outcomes · Political parties · Regression discontinuity

JEL Classification J15 · J21 · J31 · D72

1 Introduction

Immigrants are changing the racial composition of America. For instance, the share of US population that is foreign-born rose steadily from 5% in 1970 to 15% in 2010, and today there are more Latinos than African Americans (CBO 2013). This profound change in US population has major political consequences as well, because

Responsible editor: Klaus F. Zimmermann

✉ Louis-Philippe Beland
lbeland@lsu.edu

Bulent Unel
bunel@lsu.edu

[1] Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA

immigrants are more Democratic in their party identification and voting preferences (Petrocik 2009; Mayda et al. 2015).

In this paper, we estimate the causal impact of the Democratic governors on immigrants' labor market outcomes. Using more than 250 gubernatorial elections in 50 states between 1993 and 2013, we address the problem by exploiting random variation associated with close elections in a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Labor market outcomes are measured by employment status, usual hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, total annual hours, and hourly, weekly, and annual labor incomes. We find that Democratic governors have positive and significant impact on immigrants' labor market outcomes. For example, immigrants (relative to white natives) have a 1.5% higher employment rate, and increase their total annual working hours and annual earnings by 1.4 and 4.2%, respectively, under Democratic governors.

We then investigate whether the impact of party affiliation on immigrants differ with respect to immigrants' citizenship status, skill levels, sectors (private vs public) that they work, and occupations that they hold. We find that the impact of Democratic governors is more significant on non-citizen immigrants, but equally significant on skilled and unskilled immigrants. Our sectoral-level analysis yields that Democratic governors affect only immigrants working in private sector, and our occupational-level analysis indicates that the impact on immigrants are generally stronger in occupations that are more likely to be affected by Democratic governors' policies.

We also conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis to investigate the robustness of our approach and findings. A particularly important one is about the validity of the RD design for our analysis.[1] Following Lee and Lemieux's (2010) recommended checklist, we present evidences that strongly supports the validity of our approach. We also show that the main results are robust to using different samples and conditioning variables.

This paper constructs a new link between immigration and political economy literatures. The literature on immigration has mainly investigated how immigration has affected different aspects of economies such as labor markets (Hunt and Friedberg 1999; Borjas 2003; Card 2001, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri 2012), investment in human capital (McHenry 2015), productivity (Peri 2012), innovation and technological choice (Hunt 2010; Lewis 2011; Peri 2012), and prices (Cortes 2008). Another strand of the literature investigates the welfare implications of immigration, in particular, its effect on public finances (Alesina et al. 1999; Razin et al. 2002; Preston 2013). Our contribution to this literature is to uncover the impact of the political environment on immigrants' labor market outcomes.

There is a large political economy literature that have documented that US elected officials have high degree of autonomy to exercise their power in their voting

[1]Using RD designs to estimate program effects in a variety of contexts have become quite popular in economics. Lee and Lemieux (2010, 2014) provide a comprehensive review of the literature by discussing identification, interpretation, and estimation issues related to RD designs.

behavior and policy choices.[2] Besley and Case (1995, 2003), for example, find that Democratic governors are more likely to raise taxes, while Republican governors are less likely to increase minimum wages. They also find that when Democrats have a majority in the state upper and lower houses, and hold the governor's office, there is a significant impact on tax revenue, spending, family assistance, and workers' compensation.

Our paper is more closely related to a strand of this literature that uses RD designs to investigate the impact of the party affiliation on economic outcomes. In an influential paper, Lee et al. (2004), exploring variations in close elections, find that the party affiliation has a large impact on a legislator's voting behavior.[3] Employing an RD design on panel data from Swedish local governments, Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) finds that left-wing governments spend and tax 2–3% more than right-wing governments. Beland (2015), employing an RD design on close gubernatorial elections in the USA between 1977 and 2008, finds that that Democratic governors have a positive impact on labor market outcomes of blacks relative to whites. Our paper differs from his by focusing on the impact of governors' party affiliations on the labor market outcomes of immigrant workers.

Our paper is also related to a growing empirical literature that has been investigating effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating government multiplier effects.[4] In particular, recent literature has drawn attention to the point that spending multipliers vary depending on circumstances (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Fazzari et al. 2015). Our paper complements this literature by showing that the party affiliation can also affect the spending multipliers through labor markets.

The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the US electoral system, and Section 3 describes the data used in the paper and provides summary statistics. Section 4 introduces the econometric specification used in our RD design, and present main results. Section 5 discuss the robustness of our approach and results, and Section 6 concludes.

2 US state electoral system

All state governments have executive and legislative branches. The former is headed by a governor who is directly elected by his/her state's registered US citizens who are 18 years or older.[5] Governors serve four-year terms (except those in New Hampshire and Vermont where tenures are two years long), and many states have limits on

[2]The literature on this subject is vast. Important contributions are Garand (1988), Besley and Case (1995), Knight (2000), and Alt and Lowry (2000) among many others. Besley and Case (2003) provides an early review of the literature.

[3]Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) investigate whether cities are as politically polarized as states. Their RD analysis shows that whether the mayor is a Democrat or Republican has an insignificant impact on the size of local government, the composition of local public expenditure, or crime rate.

[4]See Hemming et al. (2002) for an earlier review of this literature.

[5]State governments also have judicial branch that is responsible for administering the laws of the state and resolving legal conflicts. More information about these branches can be found on https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600.

the number of terms a governor can serve.[6] Governors have a high degree of autonomy in exercising their power. They prepare and administer the budget, set policies, recommend legislations, sign laws, appoint department heads. Further, they can veto state bills, and in most states they have the power to reject parts of a bill passed by the legislature.

States also have legislatures made up of elected representatives, who make state laws and fulfill other governing responsibilities such as considering matters introduced by its members or proposed by the governor. Except for Nebraska, the legislature in each state have a smaller upper house (Senate) and a larger lower house (House of Representatives), and the former has more executive power (e.g., confirming appointments proposed by the governor). Governors are more likely to implement their policy choices if the majority of legislatures are from the same party. The recent passage of RTW laws in states following the election of Republican legislatures and governors provides support for this argument.

3 Data description

The sources of our labor market data are the March Current Population Survey (CPS) files from Integrated Public Use Micro Samples (IPUMS) (2010) for years 1994 to 2014. The time period is dictated by the availability of the data on immigrants. We consider all individuals in labor force between 18 and 64 years old; and for each person, we record the following characteristics: gender, age, race, marital status, immigration status, citizenship status, education level, employment status, industry, occupation, usual hours worked per week, weeks worked last year, labor income earned last year, and the CPS sampling weights. We classified all foreign-born individuals as immigrants (regardless of their citizenship status). In addition, we grouped individuals under three races: white, black, and others.

Income variables are deflated using personal consumption expenditure (PCE) index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2014) and are measured in 2009-chained prices.[7] After cleaning and correcting, the final sample has about 1.7 million observations over the survey years 1994–2014 (i.e., 1993–2013). About 82% of individuals are white, 10% black, and 8% other race. Immigrants make around 15% of

[6]States without term limits are Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Particularity differs from states to states. More information on term limits for governors and state legislatures are available at https://www.termlimits.org.

[7]Top-coded incomes for years 1994 and 1995 are multiplied by 1.5; but no correction made for the subsequent years. This is because, starting in 1996, top-coded income values are assigned the mean of all top-coded earners, and these numbers are substantially higher than top-coded income values reported in the previous years. The analysis without top-coded earners yields mostly the same results. Following Autor et al. (2008), workers with income below $3.35 per hour (in 2009 dollars) are dropped. In addition, to prevent measurement errors related to hours and weeks reported, in each year, the maximum hourly income of workers is limited to the top-coded annual income divided by 2000 (hours per year). In this way, we also prevent part-time workers from having a higher feasible wage than full-time, full-year workers (see Autor et al. 2008). Our results are not sensitive to such corrections.

our sample, and 60% of them are citizen. About 11% of whites, 12% of blacks, and 58% of other race are immigrants. The shares of whites and blacks among immigrants are about 65 and 9%, respectively.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics across different groups. Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations. Panel A reports statistics for all individuals. Note that about 54% of immigrants and 39% of whites have high-school or less education, suggesting that immigrants are more less-skill intensive. The unemployment rate is higher among immigrants compared to native whites. In addition, although immigrants' labor inputs (measured by hours worked per week, total weeks, and total hours) are very similar to whites, their corresponding income figures are markedly lower than those of white workers.

The winner's party and the margin of victory variables are constructed using the data on gubernatorial elections from the *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections* (Leip 2015). The data are available for the years 1990 and onward; and for elections prior to 1990, the election outcomes from the ICPSR 7757 (1995) files are used. We only consider elections where a Democrat or a Republican won. From 1993 to 2013, there are 1,031 state×year observations. Democrats governed 469 times, which is about 45% of the time. The margin of victory (MV) is defined as the proportion of votes cast for the winner minus the proportion of votes cast for the candidate who finished second. 438 out of 1031 elections have the MV less than 10%, and about 50% of these close elections were won by the Democratic governors. Furthermore, there are 235 elections resulted in a switch in the party affiliation, and 116 of these switches were from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party. Panel B in Table 1 reports descriptive statistics across different groups where the sample is restricted to close elections. Note that these statistics are very similar to those reported in panel A.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of the margin of victory for Democrats across all elections in our sample. Observe that the distribution is clustered around the cutoff point with no unusual jumps around it. In addition, the distribution does not show any skewness towards either party. Figure 1 suggests that close elections are not always won by the same party and therefore can be seen as random.

4 Empirical implementation

4.1 Econometric specification

To determine the impact of party affiliation of US governors on immigrants' labor market outcomes, we use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. We note that voter characteristics, party incumbency, and labor market conditions can influence who wins the election, which bias estimates. Following Lee (2008), this problem is solved by exploiting the random variations associated with close US gubernatorial elections.

For any labor market outcome, Y, we estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ist} = {} & \beta_o + \beta_s + \beta_t + \beta_D D_{st} + \beta_{DI} D_{st} \times Img_{ist} + \beta_{DR} D_{st} \times R_{ist} + \beta_I Img_{ist} + \beta_R R_{ist} \\ & + F(MV_{st}) + F_I(MV_{st}) \times Img_{ist} + F_R(MV_{st}) \times R_{ist} + \beta_Z Z_{ist} + \varepsilon_{ist}, \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Table 1 Summary statistics on labor market outcomes, 1993–2013

Variable	All I	Immigrants II	Whites III	Blacks IV	Others V
A. All elections					
Age	39.9	38.5	40.4	38.3	36.6
	(12.1)	(11.3)	(12.2)	(11.8)	(12.0)
Married	57,9	63.8	60.1	37.2	45.0
	(49.4)	(48.06)	(49.0)	(48.3)	(49.7)
Male (%)	53.3	59.1	53.2	45.7	51.8
	(49.9)	(49.2)	(49.9)	(49.8)	(50.0)
HSchool or less (%)	40.7	53.4	37.4	47.9	35.0
	(49.1)	(49.9)	(48.4)	(50.0)	(47.7)
Unemployment (%)	6.1	6.9	5.2	11.1	8.7
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Hours per week	38.7	38.0	39.1	36.7	37.2
	(13.2)	(13.4)	(13.1)	(13.5)	(14.3)
Total weeks	46.3	45.5	46.9	44.0	44.4
	(13.2)	(14.4)	(12.4)	(16.0)	(15.3)
Total hours	1884	1841	1915	1753	1773
	(768)	(770)	(760)	(788)	(822)
Observations	1,720,812	259,004	1,246,552	149,194	66,062
Hourly income	21.8	19.8	22.8	17.6	21.4
	(21.7)	(21.9)	(22.1)	(16.4)	(22.0)
Weekly income	901	810.3	947	704	867
	(963)	(953)	(995)	(674)	(928)
Annual income	44,414	39,634	46,870	34,129	41,987
	(48,975)	(48,012)	(50,739)	(33,858)	(46,403)
Observations	1,491,826	222,205	1,084,169	129,097	56,355
B. Elections with $\|MV\| < 10\%$					
Age	39.4	38.8	39.8	37.6	36.0
	(12.4)	(11.5)	(12.6)	(12.0)	(12.3)
Married	58.1	63.6	60.6	37.9	45.9
	(49.3)	(48.1)	(48.9)	(48.5)	(49.8)
Male (%)	52.9	59.3	53.0	45.5	52.0
	(49.9)	(49.1)	(49.9)	(49.8)	(50.0)
HSchool or less (%)	42.2	53.2	39.2	50.8	38.7
	(49.4)	(49.9)	(48.8)	(50.0)	(48.7)
Unemployment (%)	6.3	6.9	5.3	11.4	9.0
	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Hours per week	38.2	37.9	38.6	36.2	36.6
	(13.6)	(13.7)	(13.5)	(13.8)	(14.9)

Table 1 (continued)

Variable	All I	Immigrants II	Whites III	Blacks IV	Others V
Total weeks	45.9	45.1	46.4	43.4	43.7
	(13.7)	(14.7)	(12.9)	(16.5)	(15.9)
Total hours	1855	1829	1883	1723	1737
	(788)	(788)	(781)	(805)	(856)
Observations	716,778	96,707	527,793	65,911	26,367
Hourly income	21.4	19.3	22.3	17.1	20.6
	(21.0)	(21.0)	(21.6)	(15.6)	(21.8)
Weekly income	880	791	924	687	834
	(928)	(906)	(962)	(640)	(929)
Annual income	43,359	38,653	45,705	33,261	40,311
	(47,237)	(45,351)	(49,134)	(32,094)	(46,325)
Observations	623,563	83,271	460,382	57,172	22,738

Statistics are based on all individuals in labor force between 18 and 64 years old. Columns III, IV, and V exclude all immigrants. All calculations are based on the CPS weights. The data draw on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014. *MV* represents the margin of victory

where β_s and β_t denote state and time fixed effects, respectively. In specification (1), D_{st} is an indicator variable that equals one if a Democratic governor is in power in state s in year t, and Img_{ist} is a dummy variable that takes on a value one if the individual is an immigrant. $R_{ist} = [Black_{ist} \quad Other_{ist}]$ is a vector of variables that characterizes each individual's race: $Black$ equals one if the individual is black, and $Other$ equals one if she is neither white nor black. The variable MV_{st} denotes the marginal victory in the most recent gubernatorial election prior to year t in state s,



Fig. 1 Distribution of the Margin of Democratic Victory. Data from Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, Leip 2015

and $F_j(MV)$ represents a third-order polynomial function of the variable MV. The margin of victory (MV) is defined as the proportion of votes cast for the winner minus the proportion of votes cast for the candidate who finished second. The cutoff point for the MV is 0%, and in our analysis a positive MV indicates that a Democratic governor won, whereas a negative MV indicates that a Republican won.[8] The variable Z is a vector of variables that control individual characteristics such as gender, age, education level, marital status; and finally, ε_{ist} is the error term.

The coefficients of interest are β_D, β_{DI}, and β_{DR}. Note that since $R = [Black\ Other]$, the coefficient β_D measures the impact of a Democratic governor on white, native workers. According to Eq. 1, party affiliation effects (i.e., β_D, β_{DI}, β_{DR}) are estimated controlling for the variations in the MV (presented by third-order polynomial functions) as well as other individual and state characteristics. We use the following labor market outcomes in estimating (1): employment status (i.e., employed or not), usual hours worked per week, total weeks worked per year, total annual hours, hourly income, weekly income, and annual income.[9] All variables except for employment status are in logs and are conditional on working. Standard errors are clustered at the state level which enables accounting for potential serial correlation, and we use CPS weights in our regressions.

We close this section by discussing some important points related to our RD designs. First, the treatment variable D is a function of the running variable MV, with 0 being the cutoff point. It is assumed that the running variable MV is smoothly associated with labor-market outcomes, and thus any discontinuity at the cutoff captures the average causal effect of party affiliation. For this reason, we exploit variations associated with *close* elections. Second, to have unbiased RD estimates, states with close elections should be similar to each other. To test this, we first identify certain characteristics of each individual such as being immigrant, black, skilled worker, etc. Using each of these characteristics as a dependent variable and considering only data from the year prior to election in an RD regression, we estimate the coefficient on the dummy variable that a Democrat won. Our regressions (presented in Table 2A and B) indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the identification assumption is not violated.[10] Finally, as discussed by Lee and Lemieux (2010), RD designs provide estimates of the average treatment effect

[8]For Texas, for example, the 2006 election results (the political party of the winner and the margin of victory) are used in regressions for 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. We exclude observations where neither a Democrat nor a Republican won. We assume that $F_j(MV)$ is a third-order polynomial function and $F_j(MV)$ is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. However, considering first- or second-order polynomials yields very similar results. Results are also similar using local linear regression discontinuity (see Section 5).

[9]We also consider labor force status (i.e., in labor force or not) as an outcome variable. Our estimate of β_{DI} is -0.0042 (0.0033), where the number in parentheses is the standard error based on clustering data at state level. Thus, the party affiliation has no impact on the labor force status of immigrants relative to white natives.

[10]Immigrants' location choices may be affected by voting shares of parties (Damm 2009), but our identification relies on close elections. Further, one may argue that immigrants with respect to their skill levels, time spent in the US, and country of origin may choose where to live based on their political preferences. Table 2B reports results from our RD regressions based on these characteristics. Note that all estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant.

Table 2 RD estimates

A. Characteristics of states							
Variable		Img	Black	Other	Female	Skilled	Unskilled
Dem		0.0064	−0.0100	0.0020	0.0039	−0.0011	0.0011
		(0.0123)	(0.0100)	(0.0073)	(0.0030)	(0.0058)	(0.0058)
Observations		435,671	435,671	435,671	435,671	435,671	435,671
R-squared		0.4496	0.2963	0.2745	0.0009	0.0254	0.0254
B. Characteristics of immigrants							
Variable	Skilled	Unskilled	0–5 years	6–15 years	16+ years	Canadians	Mexicans
Dem	−0.0030	0.0094	0.0009	0.0015	0.0041	−0.0007	0.0000
	(0.0068)	(0.0068)	(0.0021)	(0.0039)	(0.0063)	(0.0004)	(0.0019)
Observations	435,671	435,671	435,671	435,671	435,671	435,671	435,671
R-squared	0.2469	0.1739	0.0427	0.0868	0.1415	0.0080	0.0806

The data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014. All regressions use individual-level data the year before the most recent election. Outcome variables are characteristics of states: proportion of population that is: Black, Other race, Immigrants, Female, Skilled, and Unskilled. Characteristics of immigrants are skilled, unskilled, time in the USA: 0-5 years, 6 to 15 years, more than 16 years, and immigrants are from Canada and Mexico. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively

for the subpopulation (close elections in our context), and thus have a strong internal validity. However, its external validity for non-contested elections or elections in other countries is limited.

4.2 Graphical evidence

We first present some graphic evidence on the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants' labor market outcomes. Figure 2a, b, and c investigates the discontinuity



Fig. 2 The impact of democratic governors on labor market outcomes notes: In each panel, the graph on the *left* represents white, native workers, and the graph on the *right* immigrant workers. The dependent variables in panels (**b**) and (**c**) are in logs. The data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

at 0% when a Democratic governor barely wins over a Republican. In each panel, the graph on the left represents white, native workers, and the one on the right represents immigrants. Figure 2a presents the proportion of workers employed, Fig. 2b the total hours worked, and Fig. 2c shows the annual earnings for each group.

In each graph, each dot represents the average outcome that follows election t, grouped by margin of victory intervals. Solid curves represent the predicted values from the polynomial fit without covariates. Any discontinuity around the cutoff point 0 can be interpreted as the causal impact of party affiliation. Figure 2a suggests that the proportion of immigrants who are employed under Democratic governors is higher, and Fig. 2b indicates that they work more hours. According to Fig. 2c, immigrants earn more under Democratic governors. We do not observe any jumps at the cutoff for the labor market outcomes of white, natives.

4.3 Benchmark results

Table 3 reports the results based on econometric specification (1).[11] We only report the estimates on the coefficients of interest.[12] Column I represents the impact of Democratic governors on being employed based on standard covariates. The interaction term Img×Dem measures the effect of Democratic governors on the propensity to work for immigrants relative to natives. According to column I, immigrants are more likely to be employed under a Democratic governor: the estimated coefficient is about 1.5% and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar pattern are observed for black and other races: the corresponding estimates are about 1.9 and 1.2%, and are statistically significant at the 1 and 5% level, respectively. The coefficient for natives (captured by the variable Dem) is almost zero (0.3%) and is statistically insignificant.

Column II presents the impact of Democratic governors on usual hours worked per week based on standard covariates. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are small, positive, and statistically insignificant. As in column I, the coefficient for natives is small (0.5%) and statistically insignificant. Consequently, the impact of Democratic governors on usual hours worked per week by any group is insignificant. This conclusion is not surprising because usual hours worked per week are more job specific and less flexible.

Column III reports the results where the labor market outcome is total weeks worked per year. The estimated coefficient on Img×Dem is about 1.6% and is statistically significant at the 1% level, and thus, Democratic governors has a positive effect on total weeks worked by immigrants (relative to white natives). Similar to column I, the estimated coefficients on Black×Dem and Other×Dem are also positive (2.6 and 1.8%, respectively) and statistically significant. The impact of Democratic governors on white natives is positive, small, and statistically insignificant.

[11] We also run the simple OLS regressions, and the results are given in Table 13 in the appendix. According to the OLS estimates, the Democratic Party has no significant impact on immigrants' labor market outcomes. However, these estimates suffer from biases as there are many potential unobserved factors affecting the party affiliation and outcome variables.

[12] Table 24 in the appendix replicates Table 3, but presents results for all covariates, except state and year fixed effects.

Table 3 RD estimates: impact of party affiliation on labor markets over 1993–2013

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0028	0.0046	0.0034	0.0078	−0.0009	0.0055	0.0063
	(0.0029)	(0.0032)	(0.0022)	(0.0049)	(0.0059)	(0.0065)	(0.0063)
Img×Dem	0.0146***	0.0001	0.0162***	0.0136*	0.0409***	0.0391***	0.0417***
	(0.0035)	(0.0054)	(0.0047)	(0.0080)	(0.0120)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)
Black×Dem	0.0185***	−0.0005	0.0263***	0.0224**	0.0336**	0.0318**	0.0346**
	(0.0033)	(0.0056)	(0.0055)	(0.0087)	(0.0127)	(0.0141)	(0.0147)
Other×Dem	0.0115**	0.0046	0.0180***	0.0212**	0.0151	0.0148	0.0162
	(0.0049)	(0.0052)	(0.0064)	(0.0089)	(0.0135)	(0.0147)	(0.0151)
Img	0.0047	−0.0049	−0.0007	0.0043	−0.2001***	−0.2086***	−0.2058***
	(0.0034)	(0.0053)	(0.0023)	(0.0054)	(0.0187)	(0.0197)	(0.0190)
Black	−0.0414***	0.0059*	−0.0286***	−0.0090	−0.0548***	−0.0541***	−0.0583***
	(0.0022)	(0.0031)	(0.0039)	(0.0053)	(0.0151)	(0.0157)	(0.0155)
Other	−0.0076*	−0.0042**	−0.0138**	−0.0186***	−0.0834***	−0.0753***	−0.0704***
	(0.0040)	(0.0018)	(0.0060)	(0.0056)	(0.0217)	(0.0247)	(0.0246)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0325	0.0903	0.0357	0.0588	0.3087	0.3496	0.3224

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Column IV reports the effect of Democratic governors on total annual hours worked, conditional on working. The estimated coefficients are consistent with findings in columns II and III (coefficient for Img×Dem is 1.4% and statistically significant at 10%). In sum, the results presented in columns I–IV indicate that Democratic governors have positive and statistica

lly significant impacts on immigrants' labor inputs.

The last three columns present results based on income figures. According to column V, where the dependent variable is hourly income, the estimated coefficient on Img is −20% and is highly significant, i.e., immigrants are earning significantly lower than any other group, as found in the literature. However, the coefficient on the interaction term Img×Dem is about 4.1% and is statistically significant at the 1% level; as a result, Democratic governors have a positive and significant impact on hourly income of immigrants.[13] Note that according to Column II, usual hours worked per week by immigrants are not affected by the party affiliation of governors, whereas hourly income is. This suggests that under Democratic governors immigrants have better opportunities to get better paying jobs. Democratic governors have positive and significant effects on hourly income of blacks, but not on other races. Similar pattern holds when the dependent variable is weekly or annual income (coefficients for Img×Dem are 3.9 and 4.2, respectively, and statistically significant at 1%).[14]

The impact of Democratic governors on blacks labor inputs (columns I through IV) are similar to those reported in Beland (2015).[15] A comparison of the results in Table 3 with Beland's results further indicates that including immigrants does not crowd out the impact of Democratic governors on the labor market outcomes of black workers.

4.4 Further explorations

This section conducts an extensive analysis to investigate whether the above results are mainly driven by some subgroups of immigrants. First, we investigate how the party affiliation affects labor market outcomes of citizen and non-citizen immigrants

[13] While our primary focus is the impact of party affiliation on immigrants relative to whites, one can easily calculate the total impact on immigrants by adding the estimated coefficients on D and $D_{st} \times Img_{ist}$. In this case, the total impact for Emp Status is 0.0174*** (0.0050), Hours per week 0.0047 (0.0062), total weeks 0.01963*** (0.0059), total hours 0.0214** (0.0098), hourly income 0.0400*** (0.0129), weekly income 0.0445***(0.0142), and annual income 0.0480*** (0.0144).

[14] Our findings have economically significant impact on immigrants' labor market outcomes. For example, the average annual labor income of immigrants in states where the Republican governors barely won is about $38,000. According to our estimates, their annual labor income would be about $1,500 higher if the Democratic governors won the elections.

[15] However, our findings that Democratic governors have a positive and significant impact on hourly and weekly income of black workers are different from his, and our analysis shows that these differences mainly stem from studying different time periods. Beland uses the same data sources over the period of 1977–2008, and his sample covers only the prime working age group (i.e., individuals between 20 and 55 years old). Our sample starts in 1993, following the availability of the immigrant identifier in CPS, and covers a wider age group as in Autor et al. (2008). When his sample is restricted 1993 to 2008, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3. Some differences on white native labor inputs are also due to different time periods. Considering only the prime working age group does not have significant impact on our results (see Table 19 in the appendix).

(denoted by Img-citizen, Img-noncitizen, respectively). Table 4 reports the results, and note that non-citizen immigrants make substantially less than whites (about 26% less). Further, compared to citizen immigrants, the impact of Democratic governors on earnings of non-citizen immigrants is more substantial.

Second, the impact of party affiliation on immigrants may be different with respect to their time spent in the US. To see whether this is the case, we sort immigrants into three groups based on the number of years lived in the USA: 0-5, 6–15, and 16+ years (denoted by Img-(0–5 years), Img-(6–15 years), Img-(>15 years), respectively). Results reported in Table 5 shows that the impact of the Democratic governors on each group is largely similar to their impact on all immigrants reported in Table 3.[16]

Third, we consider heterogeneity among immigrants with respect to their skill levels. Everyone who has at most high school diploma is considered as unskilled, and those who have at least some college education are classified as skilled. About 53% of immigrants and 37% of native whites are unskilled (Table 1). As Table 6 reports the results, and first note that both skilled and unskilled immigrants earn considerably less than white natives (about 12 and 28%, respectively). Second, except for hours per week, Democratic governors have a positive and significant impact on labor market outcomes of both groups. Note that estimated coefficients on Img-skilled×Dem and Img-unskilled×Dem are similar to each other.[17]

Fourth, we investigate whether immigrants working in private sector are affected differently than those working in the public sector. Results are reported in Table 7A and B, and three points are worth noting. First, relative to whites, immigrants' earnings are significantly lower in the private sector. Second, estimated coefficients on Img×Dem indicate that the Democratic governors have a significant impact on immigrants' labor market outcomes in the private sector, but not in the public sector. Consequently, the results in Table 3 are driven by immigrants working in private sector. Finally, the Democratic governors have no impact on labor market outcomes of blacks and other race in the public sector either.[18]

Recent studies have shown that Democratic governors generally raise minimum wages and taxes, spend more on education and health, and support unions (Darke

[16]Relatedly, we also explored heterogeneity among immigrants with respect to their country of origin, since immigration from different countries can have different effects on voting shares of the Democratic and Republican Party (Mayda et al., 2015). We assigned immigrants into 7 regions where they come from: Canada, Mexico, the rest of America, Asia, Africa, Europe, and Other. Table 14 in the appendix reports the results from this exercise, and for the sake of brevity we only report the coefficients related to these variables. Note that the impact of Democratic governors on labor market outcomes of Mexican immigrants (who constitutes the largest share in the population) is generally higher than that on all immigrants reported in Table 3.

[17]We find that for all regressions of Table 6, the coefficients for Img-skilled×Dem and Img-unskilled×Dem are not statistically different from each other at the 5% level. Running separate RD regressions for skilled and unskilled workers yields qualitatively similar results as shown in Table 15A and B. Table 15A and B both shows that under Democratic governors, there is improvement in labor market outcomes of immigrants, blacks and others (relative to white natives) In Table 15A, our reference group is the low-skill, white, natives. According to Table 15A, labor market outcomes of low-skill, white natives are relatively better under Democratic governors.

[18]We also run regressions where skilled and unskileld immigrants are included as in Table 6. Our results using private sector data are very similar to those reported in Table 6. We do not find any impact of Democratic governors on skilled and unskilled immigrants' labor market outcomes in the public sector.

Table 4 RD estimates: impact of party affiliation on labor markets Over 1993–2013, Citizen vs non-citizen immigrants

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0029	0.0053*	0.0039**	0.0092**	−0.0009	0.0057	0.0070
	(0.0026)	(0.0031)	(0.0019)	(0.0043)	(0.0056)	(0.0058)	(0.0058)
Img-citizen×Dem	0.0095**	0.0009	0.0107**	0.0130	0.0133	0.0136	0.0163
	(0.0036)	(0.0053)	(0.0046)	(0.0090)	(0.0105)	(0.0118)	(0.0117)
Img-non-citizen×Dem	0.0139***	−0.0065	0.0115**	0.0080	0.0381***	0.0318**	0.0350**
	(0.0042)	(0.0054)	(0.0048)	(0.0084)	(0.0141)	(0.0137)	(0.0138)
Black×Dem	0.0164***	−0.0035	0.0230***	0.0214**	0.0226*	0.0188	0.0219
	(0.0035)	(0.0056)	(0.0053)	(0.0096)	(0.0133)	(0.0142)	(0.0144)
Other×Dem	0.0106**	0.0020	0.0184***	0.0193**	0.0102	0.0081	0.0097
	(0.0049)	(0.0051)	(0.0061)	(0.0090)	(0.0145)	(0.0156)	(0.0158)
Img-citizen	0.0136***	0.0104**	0.0153***	0.0304***	−0.0806***	−0.0807***	−0.0812***
	(0.0027)	(0.0045)	(0.0026)	(0.0066)	(0.0136)	(0.0142)	(0.0140)
Img-noncitizen	0.0014	−0.0140**	−0.0190***	−0.0304***	−0.2556***	−0.2673***	−0.2623***
	(0.0050)	(0.0055)	(0.0030)	(0.0064)	(0.0170)	(0.0168)	(0.0162)
Black	−0.0402***	0.0056	−0.0272***	−0.0254***	−0.0497***	−0.0482***	−0.0521***
	(0.0024)	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0056)	(0.0173)	(0.0179)	(0.0175)
Other	−0.0076**	−0.0050**	−0.0157***	−0.0221***	−0.0549***	−0.0443**	−0.0400**
	(0.0033)	(0.0020)	(0.0044)	(0.0057)	(0.0195)	(0.0190)	(0.0193)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0331	0.1011	0.0386	0.0955	0.3109	0.3517	0.3238

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img-citizen×Dem, Img-noncitizen×Dem Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants citizen, immigrants noncitizen, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 5 RD stimates: impact of party affiliation on labor markets with respect to years of immigration, 1993–2013

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0023	0.0037	0.0020	0.0057	0.0028	0.0071	0.0077
	(0.0020)	(0.0025)	(0.0019)	(0.0039)	(0.0059)	(0.0066)	(0.0065)
Img-(0–5 years)×Dem	0.0141***	−0.0057	0.0155	0.0098	0.0524***	0.0431**	0.0453**
	(0.0051)	(0.0084)	(0.0113)	(0.0170)	(0.0196)	(0.0198)	(0.0204)
Img-(6–15 years)×Dem	0.0158***	0.0001	0.0169***	0.0170**	0.0500***	0.0492***	0.0512***
	(0.0044)	(0.0052)	(0.0042)	(0.0072)	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0141)
Img-(>15 years)×Dem	0.0183***	0.0037	0.0205***	0.0242**	0.0397***	0.0393***	0.0425***
	(0.0031)	(0.0061)	(0.0051)	(0.0094)	(0.0123)	(0.0146)	(0.0145)
Black×Dem	0.0211***	0.0010	0.0296***	0.0306***	0.0374***	0.0353**	0.0380**
	(0.0033)	(0.0056)	(0.0055)	(0.0092)	(0.0129)	(0.0141)	(0.0145)
Other×Dem	0.0135**	0.0047	0.0198***	0.0245***	0.0189	0.0180	0.0194
	(0.0051)	(0.0050)	(0.0064)	(0.0084)	(0.0134)	(0.0145)	(0.0150)
Img-(0–5 years)	0.0017	−0.0162**	−0.0472***	−0.0633***	−0.2745***	−0.2826***	−0.2797***
	(0.0052)	(0.0065)	(0.0045)	(0.0085)	(0.0137)	(0.0143)	(0.0139)
Img-(6–15 years)	0.0104**	−0.0128***	0.0084***	−0.0044	−0.2285***	−0.2449***	−0.2409***
	(0.0040)	(0.0045)	(0.0025)	(0.0051)	(0.0203)	(0.0209)	(0.0202)
Img-(>15 years)	0.0072***	0.0021	0.0123***	0.0144*	−0.1265***	−0.1305***	−0.1291***
	(0.0025)	(0.0056)	(0.0033)	(0.0079)	(0.0208)	(0.0227)	(0.0221)

Table 5 (continued)

Variable	Emp Status I	Hours per Week II	Total Weeks III	Total Hours IV	Hourly Income V	Weekly Income VI	Annual Income VII
Black	−0.0466***	0.0060*	−0.0333***	−0.0274***	−0.0744***	−0.0722***	−0.0762***
	(0.0023)	(0.0032)	(0.0042)	(0.0059)	(0.0161)	(0.0169)	(0.0166)
Other	−0.0080*	−0.0032*	−0.0132**	−0.0164**	−0.0902***	−0.0815***	−0.0766***
	(0.0042)	(0.0019)	(0.0064)	(0.0074)	(0.0202)	(0.0225)	(0.0224)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0303	0.1010	0.0408	0.0953	0.3024	0.3455	0.3195

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relatives to white natives, respectively. Img×Dem is separated by years since immigration: (0-5years), (6-15years) and (>15years). F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 6 RD Estimates: Impact of Party Affiliation on Labor Markets Over 1993–2013, Skilled vs Unskilled Immigrants

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0032	0.0053*	0.0043**	0.0096**	−0.0032	0.0033	0.0047
	(0.0029)	(0.0031)	(0.0021)	(0.0045)	(0.0058)	(0.0065)	(0.0064)
Img-skilled×Dem	0.0152***	0.0011	0.0174***	0.0205**	0.0308**	0.0298**	0.0311**
	(0.0038)	(0.0054)	(0.0045)	(0.0089)	(0.0119)	(0.0130)	(0.0132)
Img-unskilled×Dem	0.0181***	0.0009	0.0106**	0.0171**	0.0299**	0.0260*	0.0269*
	(0.0041)	(0.0061)	(0.0047)	(0.0071)	(0.0146)	(0.0153)	(0.0148)
Black×Dem	0.0210***	0.0014	0.0251***	0.0298***	0.0273**	0.0259**	0.0276**
	(0.0034)	(0.0048)	(0.0054)	(0.0085)	(0.0116)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)
Other×Dem	0.0130**	0.0054	0.0183***	0.0237***	0.0101	0.0102	0.0114
	(0.0049)	(0.0046)	(0.0066)	(0.0085)	(0.0121)	(0.0130)	(0.0131)
Img-skilled	−0.0016	−0.0052	−0.0079**	−0.0119*	−0.1163***	−0.1222***	−0.1226***
	(0.0030)	(0.0042)	(0.0031)	(0.0070)	(0.0135)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)
Img-unskilled	0.0104**	−0.0065	−0.0018	−0.0036	−0.2774***	−0.2855***	−0.2822***
	(0.0049)	(0.0065)	(0.0031)	(0.0071)	(0.0229)	(0.0240)	(0.0231)
Black	−0.0406***	0.0048	−0.0249***	−0.0240***	−0.0654***	−0.0650***	−0.0674***
	(0.0022)	(0.0030)	(0.0031)	(0.0054)	(0.0138)	(0.0147)	(0.0149)
Other	−0.0054	−0.0037**	−0.0106**	−0.0151**	−0.0531***	−0.0438**	−0.0411**
	(0.0036)	(0.0018)	(0.0051)	(0.0067)	(0.0183)	(0.0200)	(0.0198)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0332	0.1010	0.0383	0.0951	0.3124	0.3529	0.3998

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img-skilled×Dem, Img-unskilled×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on skilled immigrants, unskilled immigrants, blacks and others, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 7 RD Estimates: Impact of Party Affiliation on Labor Markets Over 1993–2013

Variable	Emp Status I	Hours per Week II	Total Weeks III	Total Hours IV	Hourly Income V	Weekly Income VI	Annual Income VII
A. Private Sector							
Dem	0.0022	0.0053*	0.0029	0.0082	0.0046	0.0065	0.0069
	(0.0017)	(0.0030)	(0.0025)	(0.0050)	(0.0052)	(0.0064)	(0.0062)
Img×Dem	0.0122***	−0.0011	0.0184***	0.0173**	0.0534***	0.0445***	0.0486***
	(0.0028)	(0.0042)	(0.0053)	(0.0077)	(0.0115)	(0.0112)	(0.0113)
Black×Dem	0.0176***	−0.0020	0.0310***	0.0291***	0.0411***	0.0274**	0.0316**
	(0.0031)	(0.0045)	(0.0072)	(0.0104)	(0.0125)	(0.0123)	(0.0125)
Other×Dem	0.0115**	0.0039	0.0179***	0.0214**	0.0050	0.0044	0.0054
	(0.0048)	(0.0047)	(0.0065)	(0.0087)	(0.0121)	(0.0130)	(0.0129)
Img	0.0097***	−0.0068	0.0019	−0.0050	−0.2069***	−0.2033***	−0.2006***
	(0.0033)	(0.0045)	(0.0025)	(0.0057)	(0.0194)	(0.0193)	(0.0186)
Black	−0.0276***	−0.0001	−0.0391***	−0.0392***	−0.0614***	−0.0425***	−0.0471***
	(0.0024)	(0.0026)	(0.0042)	(0.0059)	(0.0149)	(0.0145)	(0.0144)
Other	−0.0029	−0.0059**	−0.0175***	−0.0234***	−0.0764***	−0.0747***	−0.0700***
	(0.0040)	(0.0023)	(0.0059)	(0.0049)	(0.0235)	(0.0260)	(0.0258)
Observations	1,240,339	1,240,339	1,240,339	1,240,339	1,186,335	1,186,335	1,186,335
R-squared	0.0212	0.1133	0.0427	0.1017	0.3164	0.3312	0.3161

Table 7 (continued)

Variable	Emp Status I	Hours per Week II	Total Weeks III	Total Hours IV	Hourly Income V	Weekly Income VI	Annual Income VII
B. Public Sector							
Dem	−0.0006	−0.0012	−0.0006	−0.0018	0.0008	0.0017	0.0029
	(0.0016)	(0.0047)	(0.0033)	(0.0062)	(0.0084)	(0.0099)	(0.0098)
Img×Dem	0.0037	0.0025	0.0106	0.0131	−0.0049	0.0111	0.0092
	(0.0038)	(0.0150)	(0.0097)	(0.0220)	(0.0213)	(0.0222)	(0.0228)
Black×Dem	0.0056	0.0016	0.0104	0.0120	−0.0107	0.0167	0.0153
	(0.0042)	(0.0200)	(0.0079)	(0.0212)	(0.0216)	(0.0265)	(0.0268)
Other×Dem	0.0103**	0.0023	−0.0020	0.0003	−0.0040	0.0197	0.0204
	(0.0043)	(0.0107)	(0.0123)	(0.0144)	(0.0319)	(0.0303)	(0.0313)
Img	0.0003	−0.0530***	−0.0114**	−0.0644***	−0.1082***	−0.1360***	−0.1347***
	(0.0026)	(0.0084)	(0.0043)	(0.0117)	(0.0124)	(0.0153)	(0.0148)
Black	−0.0123***	0.0170*	0.0056	0.0226*	−0.0241*	−0.0161	−0.0208
	(0.0024)	(0.0090)	(0.0046)	(0.0115)	(0.0134)	(0.0165)	(0.0155)
Other	−0.0076	−0.0140	−0.0034	−0.0174	−0.0589**	−0.0128	−0.0105
	(0.0047)	(0.0157)	(0.0110)	(0.0249)	(0.0231)	(0.0205)	(0.0196)
Observations	253,092	253,092	253,092	253,092	244,614	244,614	244,614
R-squared	0.0162	0.1084	0.0501	0.1113	0.2933	0.3345	0.3112

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 8 RD Estimates: Impact of Party Affiliation on Policy Variables Over 1993–2013

	Min	Expenditure			Union	State
Variable	Wage	Education	Health	Infrs	Rate	EITC
Dem	0.0717*	0.0304**	0.0239**	0.0341	0.0003	0.0531
	(0.0392)	(0.0141)	(0.0134)	(0.0959)	(0.0020)	(0.5899)
Observations	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031
R-squared	0.024	0.3700	0.3663	0.2581	0.3641	0.0666

The independent variable is the dummy variable Dem. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors. Expenditure are in logs. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

2001; Besley and Case 2003; Beland and Oloomi 2017 among others). Applying the RD design to our sample, we also investigate the impact of the party affiliation of the governors on these variables. Table 8 reports results, which are largely consistent with the previous studies.[19] Therefore, our final analysis investigates how the Democratic governors affect immigrants with respect to their occupations. We consider two samples: one includes occupations that are *more likely* to be affected by the above government policies, and the other includes remaining occupations.[20] More than 60% of immigrants are in the first sample, and with the exception of health care and teaching, occupations in this sample are mainly held by unskilled workers.[21]

Tables 9 and 10 report the results based on these samples, and a comparison of these tables with Table 3 indicates that the results are mainly driven by occupations listed in the first sample.[22] Our analysis in this section suggests that the positive impact of Democratic governors on immigrants' labor market outcomes might stem

[19]The impact of spending on infrastructure is insignificant, but the estimated coefficient is very similar to that on education and health. Although Democrats have strong political ties with unions (e.g., Dark 2001), their impact on unionization is insignificant, which is consistent with Beland and Unel (2017). Finally, the last column look at the impact of party affiliation on state EITC.

[20]As discussed above, Democratic governors spend more on education and health, and unions are strong in these sectors. In addition, their minimum wage and tax policies are most likely to affect occupations such as maintenance and repair, farming, food preparation and serving, construction and assemblers & operators. Therefore, our first sample includes the following occupations: maintenance and repair, farming, food preparation and serving, personal care, health care, teaching, construction and assemblers and operators. The other sample includes managers and CEOs, business and finance specialists, architects, engineers, scientists, technicians, sales specialists, and administrative support. Each sample contains about 800,000 individuals.

[21]We also run an RD design where the outcome variable is a dummy variable that equals one if an individual is in the sample that is more likely affected by governors' policies, and zero otherwise. Our estimated coefficients for Img and Img×Dem respectively are 0.1438 (0.0084) and −0.0059 (0.0060), indicating that immigrants are more likely to hold occupations listed in the first sample, but the impact of Democratic governors on their occupational choice (i.e., the first or second sample) is insignificant.

[22]We also investigate skill heterogeneity as in Table 6 for our two different samples. Tables 16 and 17 in the appendix report the results, and note that they are largely consistent with the conclusion on Tables 9 and 10.

Table 9 RD estimates: party affiliation on labor markets, occupations more likely affected by gov. policies

Variable	Emp Status I	Hours per Week II	Total Weeks III	Total Hours IV	Hourly Income V	Weekly Income VI	Annual Income VII
Dem	0.0063	0.0061	0.0086***	0.0147**	0.0051	0.0116	0.0129
	(0.0047)	(0.0038)	(0.0031)	(0.0059)	(0.0075)	(0.0085)	(0.0080)
Img×Dem	0.0194***	−0.0025	0.0139*	0.0114	0.0558***	0.0515***	0.0535***
	(0.0050)	(0.0061)	(0.0070)	(0.0100)	(0.0146)	(0.0141)	(0.0140)
Black×Dem	0.0235***	−0.0003	0.0307***	0.0304***	0.0529***	0.0516***	0.0560***
	(0.0044)	(0.0069)	(0.0061)	(0.0113)	(0.0138)	(0.0159)	(0.0160)
Other×Dem	0.0129**	−0.0039	0.0164**	0.0125	0.0277***	0.0219*	0.0241**
	(0.0052)	(0.0061)	(0.0078)	(0.0114)	(0.0097)	(0.0114)	(0.0119)
Img	0.0149***	0.0117	0.0127***	0.0244***	−0.1936***	−0.1914***	−0.1902***
	(0.0040)	(0.0073)	(0.0034)	(0.0086)	(0.0188)	(0.0189)	(0.0181)
Black	−0.0473***	0.0141***	−0.0294***	−0.0153**	−0.0335*	−0.0243	−0.0332*
	(0.0030)	(0.0031)	(0.0045)	(0.0063)	(0.0175)	(0.0178)	(0.0177)
Other	−0.0130***	0.0070**	−0.0135**	−0.0065	−0.0565**	−0.0539**	−0.0478*
	(0.0039)	(0.0031)	(0.0060)	(0.0062)	(0.0220)	(0.0258)	(0.0251)
Observations	856,973	821,196	821,196	821,196	727,080	727,080	727,080
R-squared	0.0396	0.0927	0.0381	0.0841	0.2679	0.3081	0.3158

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. The sample includes occupations that are more likely to be affected by the government policies. These occupations are construction, maintenance and repair, farming, food preparation and serving, personal care, health care, teaching, and assemblers & operators occupations. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 10 RD estimates: party affiliation on labor markets, occupations less likely affected by gov. policies

Variable	Emp Status I	Hours per Week II	Total Weeks III	Total Hours IV	Hourly Income V	Weekly Income VI	Annual Income VII
Dem	−0.0001	0.0052	0.0005	0.0070	−0.0062	0.0010	0.0018
	(0.0021)	(0.0034)	(0.0021)	(0.0045)	(0.0061)	(0.0068)	(0.0066)
Img×Dem	0.0052	0.0019	0.0081*	0.0033	0.0018	−0.0086	−0.0077
	(0.0031)	(0.0070)	(0.0044)	(0.0061)	(0.0167)	(0.0166)	(0.0164)
Black×Dem	0.0093**	−0.0018	0.0105**	0.0047	−0.0150	−0.0019	−0.0017
	(0.0038)	(0.0067)	(0.0047)	(0.0084)	(0.0183)	(0.0169)	(0.0176)
Other×Dem	0.0072	0.0081	0.0116**	0.0142*	−0.0227	−0.0144	−0.0136
	(0.0048)	(0.0062)	(0.0048)	(0.0081)	(0.0169)	(0.0155)	(0.0162)
Img	0.0022	−0.0112***	−0.0113***	−0.0275***	−0.1244***	−0.1295***	−0.1284***
	(0.0029)	(0.0034)	(0.0042)	(0.0054)	(0.0126)	(0.0137)	(0.0135)
Black	−0.0317***	0.0014	−0.0107***	−0.0201***	−0.0697***	−0.0723***	−0.0716***
	(0.0036)	(0.0037)	(0.0032)	(0.0053)	(0.0080)	(0.0093)	(0.0093)
Other	−0.0024	−0.0163***	−0.0107**	−0.0293***	−0.0528***	−0.0356*	−0.0344*
	(0.0025)	(0.0028)	(0.0041)	(0.0067)	(0.0181)	(0.0199)	(0.0201)
Observations	863,839	840,793	840,793	840,793	740,880	740,880	740,880
R-squared	0.0208	0.1166	0.0385	0.1082	0.3212	0.3783	0.3544

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. The sample includes occupations that are less likely to be affected by the government policies. These occupations are managers & CEOs, business & finance specialists, architects & engineers, natural scientists, social scientists & workers, engineering & science technicians, sales specialists, and administrative support occupations. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014



Fig. 3 Density Function of the Margin of Victory, McCrary's (2008) Test. *Dashed curves* represent 95% confidence intervals. Data from Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, Leip 2015

from implementing certain policies and creating a business environment that has positive effects on occupations where immigrants are more concentrated.

5 Sensitivity analysis

An important assumption in our RD design is that each candidate has imprecise control over the election result. One easy way is to look at the histogram of the MV presented in Fig. 1, and we do not observe any unusual jumps around the cutoff. A more formal approach is McCrary's (2008) test of manipulation related to continuity of the running variable density function. Figure 3 represents the density function based on McCrary (2008), where the dark curve represents the estimated kernel density function, and the dashed curves represent the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Note that there are no unusual jumps around the cutoff.[23]

[23] We also verified that states where Democrats barely won and states where Democrats barely lost are not statistically different from each other in their pre-treatment covariates. To address the issues raised in Caughey and Sekhon (2011), using data from Jensen and Beyle (2003), we found that campaign spending is not different when Democrats barely wins than when they barely lost. In addition, for close elections to be regarded as random, such elections won by Democratic governors should not be more likely to come with a Democratic House or Senate. We checked and confirmed that those variables are not statistically different when Democrats barely won.

Table 11 RD estimates: local linear analysis

	Emp status I	Total hours II	Annual income III
A. White Natives			
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)	0.0001	−0.0010	−0.0107
	(0.0005)	(0.0018)	(0.0128)
h (optimal bandwidth)	10.3	9.9	10.5
Calonico et al. (2012)	−0.0001	−0.0019	−0.0142
	(0.0005)	(0.0016)	(0.0120)
h (optimal bandwidth)	12.5	12.1	12.5
B. Immigrants			
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)	0.0108***	0.0152*	0.0750**
	(0.0039)	(0.0082)	(0.0347)
h (optimal bandwidth)	17.6	14.1	12.3
Calonico et al. (2012)	0.0108***	0.0146*	0.0771**
	(0.0039)	(0.0077)	(0.0336)
h (optimal bandwidth)	17.7	16.1	13.7

The coefficients represents the impact of the independent variable Dem, which represents the impact of Democratic governors. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; h is the optimal bandwith; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively

Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we also investigate the robustness of the results to a range of orders of the polynomials and a range of bandwidths. In our main specifications, we use a third-order polynomial function for $F(MV)$. We also considered first-, second-, and fourth-order of polynomial functions, and results remain mostly the same (see, for example, Table 18 in the appendix for results based on the second-order polynomial). We also consider non-parametric regression discontinuity, and Table 11 reports the results for the local linear specifications using grouped data by state and year. A comparison with Table 3 indicate that our results are robust across different specifications.[24]

Another identification concern is the persistence of the outcome variables. For example, if Democratic governors are more likely to be elected in state-years when immigrants and/or minorities have better labor market inputs, the RD designs yield biased estimates. Following Feirrera and Gyourko (2009) and Cellini et al. (2010),

[24] In our non-parameteric RD analysis, we calculate the optimal bandwith using procedures developed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman's (2012) and Calonico et al. (2012). As Table 11 shows, they yield qualitatively similar results.

Table 12 Placebo RD estimates: using outcome variables the year before the most recent election

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0030	0.0029	0.0003	0.0093	−0.0094	0.0015	0.0036
	(0.0046)	(0.0036)	(0.0046)	(0.0063)	(0.0092)	(0.0092)	(0.0094)
Img×Dem	0.0000	0.0003	−0.0042	−0.0051	−0.0086	−0.0103	−0.0091
	(0.0036)	(0.0061)	(0.0078)	(0.0107)	(0.0138)	(0.0158)	(0.0151)
Black×Dem	0.0021	−0.0056	0.0058	−0.0007	−0.0162	−0.0127	−0.0189
	(0.0056)	(0.0065)	(0.0083)	(0.0124)	(0.0125)	(0.0130)	(0.0128)
Other×Dem	0.0009	−0.0104	0.0041	−0.0057	−0.0056	−0.0172	−0.0144
	(0.0061)	(0.0068)	(0.0071)	(0.0078)	(0.0159)	(0.0173)	(0.0172)
Img	0.0062*	−0.0074	−0.0030	0.0005	−0.2089***	−0.2184***	−0.2162***
	(0.0034)	(0.0056)	(0.0038)	(0.0072)	(0.0206)	(0.0210)	(0.0207)
Black	−0.0405***	0.0043	−0.0277***	−0.0099	−0.0564***	−0.0550***	−0.0601***
	(0.0038)	(0.0044)	(0.0065)	(0.0084)	(0.0142)	(0.0148)	(0.0148)
Other	−0.0072	−0.0012	−0.0151	−0.0172**	−0.1146***	−0.1067***	−0.1033***
	(0.0052)	(0.0038)	(0.0095)	(0.0081)	(0.0240)	(0.0264)	(0.0255)
Observations	435,649	420,931	420,931	420,931	377,979	377,979	377,979
R-squared	0.0326	0.0902	0.0356	0.0588	0.3107	0.3502	0.3217

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

we run a placebo RD test. Specifically, we use outcome variables the year before the most recent election, and estimate specification (1). If the estimated coefficients are significant, then our estimates are mainly driven by the persistence of outcome variables, not by the party affiliation. The regression results (presented in Table 12) show that the coefficients of interest are not significant, suggesting no discontinuity in the year before the most recent election.

We also considered the following specifications: (1) considering only the prime-age (20–55 years old) group, (2) including region-specific time effects, (3) using the net labor income (i.e., after-tax income), and (4) including more controls such as state-level unemployemnt rate, state per capita income, and a dummy whether the senate is controlled by Democrats, a dummy for a Democratic governor being in power during the previous term. Tables 19–22 report corresponding results, and note that they are similar to those in Table 3.

Finally, it can be argued that governors are more likely to make a difference when they are matched with legislatures that are of the same party. Consequently, we also investigate the impact of party affiliation on immigrants' labor market outcomes when both governors and legislatures are from the same party. However, our RD analysis yields qualitatively the same results (Table 23).

6 Conclusion

Immigration has become a pressing issue for politicians in the USA, because immigrants have been playing increasingly significant role in the economy and politics. When it comes to political party preferences, immigrants have overwhelmingly voted for the Democratic party. One wonders whether immigrants are economically better off under the Democratic Party.

Using more than 250 gubernatorial elections in 50 states between 1993 and 2013, this paper investigated the causal impact of the party affiliations of US governors on immigrants' labor market outcomes. We implemented a regression discontinuity (RD) design by exploiting the variation associated with close elections. Our analysis shows that immigrants have experienced different labor market outcomes under the Democratic Party. In particular, we found that immigrants are more likely to be employed, work longer hours and more weeks, and have higher earnings under Democratic governors. We also found that this impact differs across immigrants with respect to their skill levels, sectors (private vs public) where they work, and occupations that they hold. Our extensive sensitivity analysis shows that the results are robust to a number of different specifications, controls, and samples.

Acknowledgments We thank the editor Klaus F. Zimmermann and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.

Appendix

Table 13 OLS estimates: impact of party affiliation on labor markets over 1993–2013

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0007	0.0013	−0.0002	0.0011	−0.0059*	−0.0047	−0.0052
	(0.0016)	(0.0017)	(0.0016)	(0.0031)	(0.0034)	(0.0041)	(0.0053)
Img×Dem	0.0009	−0.0001	−0.0012	−0.0013	0.0180***	0.0170**	0.0148*
	(0.0025)	(0.0041)	(0.0030)	(0.0045)	(0.0061)	(0.0080)	(0.0080)
Black×Dem	0.0009	−0.0006	0.0037	0.0031	−0.0018	−0.0015	0.0026
	(0.0025)	(0.0026)	(0.0048)	(0.0067)	(0.0077)	(0.0083)	(0.0094)
Other×Dem	0.0002	0.0041	0.0036	0.0077	−0.0110	−0.0089	−0.0026
	(0.0032)	(0.0033)	(0.0044)	(0.0059)	(0.0113)	(0.0111)	(0.0107)
Img	0.0001	−0.0076	−0.0061***	−0.0137**	−0.2100***	−0.2230***	−0.2315***
	(0.0030)	(0.0051)	(0.0014)	(0.0058)	(0.0191)	(0.0204)	(0.0207)
Black	−0.0464***	0.0027*	−0.0341***	−0.0314***	−0.0786***	−0.0839***	−0.1133***
	(0.0020)	(0.0015)	(0.0031)	(0.0039)	(0.0098)	(0.0100)	(0.0099)
Other	−0.0104**	−0.0047**	−0.0159**	−0.0206***	0.0297*	0.0239	0.0097
	(0.0042)	(0.0019)	(0.0066)	(0.0071)	(0.0164)	(0.0159)	(0.0205)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0329	0.1009	0.0409	0.0950	0.3079	0.3414	0.3141

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 14 RD estimates: impact of party affiliation on labor markets over 1993–2013, by Country of Origins

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total wours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0019	0.0038	0.0020	0.0058	0.0013	0.0009	0.0018
	(0.0020)	(0.0025)	(0.0020)	(0.0040)	(0.0054)	(0.0056)	(0.0054)
Canada×Dem	0.0209**	−0.0023	0.0082	0.0058	0.0617**	0.0572**	0.0589**
	(0.0099)	(0.0185)	(0.0183)	(0.0228)	(0.0264)	(0.0279)	(0.0290)
Mexico×Dem	0.0240***	0.0101	0.0117	0.0218**	0.0600***	0.0563***	0.0610***
	(0.0069)	(0.0081)	(0.0077)	(0.0100)	(0.0196)	(0.0197)	(0.0212)
America×Dem	0.0275***	0.0035	0.0281***	0.0316***	0.0441***	0.0412***	0.0459***
	(0.0049)	(0.0051)	(0.0066)	(0.0089)	(0.0134)	(0.0137)	(0.0150)
Africa×Dem	0.0047	0.0046	−0.0001	0.0046	0.0169	0.0189	0.0232
	(0.0079)	(0.0080)	(0.0148)	(0.0165)	(0.0241)	(0.0251)	(0.0245)
Asia×Dem	0.0068**	−0.0000	0.0150**	0.0150	0.0191	0.0183	0.0205
	(0.0028)	(0.0048)	(0.0067)	(0.0098)	(0.0134)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)
Europe×Dem	0.0337***	0.0026	0.0251**	0.0277**	0.0622***	0.0563**	0.0600**
	(0.0067)	(0.0079)	(0.0105)	(0.0113)	(0.0232)	(0.0233)	(0.0251)
Other×Dem	0.0162*	−0.0019	0.0246	0.0228	0.0531*	0.0516*	0.0555*
	(0.0087)	(0.0124)	(0.0171)	(0.0176)	(0.0301)	(0.0304)	(0.0323)
Canada	0.0118**	−0.0021	−0.0029	−0.0050	0.1351***	0.1274***	0.1295***
	(0.0049)	(0.0115)	(0.0122)	(0.0187)	(0.0215)	(0.0226)	(0.0235)
Mexico	0.0061	−0.0140	0.0023	−0.0117	−0.2871***	−0.2852***	−0.2804***
	(0.0071)	(0.0086)	(0.0035)	(0.0080)	(0.0138)	(0.0137)	(0.0136)

Table 14 (continued)

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
America	0.0032	−0.0071	−0.0040	−0.0111*	−0.1897***	−0.1875***	−0.1865***
	(0.0042)	(0.0060)	(0.0033)	(0.0064)	(0.0169)	(0.0160)	(0.0157)
Africa	0.0121**	−0.0191**	−0.0244**	−0.0435***	−0.1182***	−0.1216***	−0.1217***
	(0.0058)	(0.0072)	(0.0103)	(0.0122)	(0.0160)	(0.0163)	(0.0160)
Asia	0.0150***	−0.0058	0.0120**	0.0062	−0.0713***	−0.0728***	−0.0713***
	(0.0048)	(0.0051)	(0.0049)	(0.0065)	(0.0098)	(0.0093)	(0.0096)
Europe	0.0013	0.0126**	−0.0031	0.0095	−0.0254**	−0.0252**	−0.0247**
	(0.0024)	(0.0050)	(0.0054)	(0.0094)	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0106)
Other	0.0101**	0.0092	−0.0066	0.0026	−0.1093***	−0.1110***	−0.1121***
	(0.0046)	(0.0081)	(0.0099)	(0.0112)	(0.0107)	(0.0108)	(0.0102)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0303	0.1010	0.0403	0.0950	0.3419	0.3742	0.4093

America refers to the rest of America including Caribbeans. All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Country×Dem, represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants by country of origin, relative to white natives. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 15 RD estimates: impact of party affiliation on labor markets over 1993–2013

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
A. Low-skill only							
Dem	0.0039*	0.0108**	0.0077**	0.0198***	0.0123*	0.0179**	0.0181**
	(0.0022)	(0.0041)	(0.0033)	(0.0062)	(0.0079)	(0.0084)	(0.0083)
Img×Dem	0.0265***	0.0133*	0.0217***	0.0309***	0.0694***	0.0673***	0.0719***
	(0.0055)	(0.0070)	(0.0062)	(0.0100)	(0.0118)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)
Black×Dem	0.0272***	0.0095	0.0362***	0.0411***	0.0676***	0.0656***	0.0710***
	(0.0060)	(0.0075)	(0.0075)	(0.0114)	(0.0139)	(0.0141)	(0.0145)
Other×Dem	0.0189***	0.0099*	0.0201**	0.0249**	0.0221	0.0195	0.0219
	(0.0049)	(0.0058)	(0.0080)	(0.0109)	(0.0143)	(0.0137)	(0.0139)
Img	0.0147***	0.0017	0.0108***	0.0221***	-0.2469***	-0.2536***	−0.2489***
	(0.0029)	(0.0071)	(0.0035)	(0.0053)	(0.0086)	(0.0090)	(0.0087)
Black	−0.0547***	−0.0055	−0.0424***	−0.0390***	−0.0573***	−0.0634***	−0.0698***
	(0.0033)	(0.0038)	(0.0058)	(0.0058)	(0.0077)	(0.0082)	(0.0081)
Other	−0.0113***	0.0078**	−0.0186***	−0.0107*	−0.0417***	−0.0480***	−0.0428***
	(0.0031)	(0.0037)	(0.0057)	(0.0059)	(0.0111)	(0.0120)	(0.0121)
Observations	704,324	671,159	671,159	671,159	594,223	594,223	594,223
R-squared	0.0372	0.0713	0.0374	0.0482	0.1608	0.2098	0.2796

Table 15 (continued)

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
B. High-skill only							
Dem	0.0018	0.0018	0.0010	0.0018	−0.0157	−0.0155	−0.0140
	(0.0019)	(0.0038)	(0.0024)	(0.0055)	(0.0140)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)
Img×Dem	0.0099***	−0.0068	0.0151**	0.0067	0.0303***	0.0219**	0.0236**
	(0.0034)	(0.0075)	(0.0068)	(0.0140)	(0.0093)	(0.0096)	(0.0096)
Black×Dem	0.0147***	−0.0042	0.0201***	0.0139	0.0462***	0.0332***	0.0324***
	(0.0046)	(0.0080)	(0.0073)	(0.0131)	(0.0114)	(0.0120)	(0.0120)
Other×Dem	0.0078*	0.0015	0.0155**	0.0185*	0.0542***	0.0380***	0.0364***
	(0.0043)	(0.0068)	(0.0070)	(0.0106)	(0.0094)	(0.0110)	(0.0108)
Img	−0.0043*	−0.0093**	−0.0106***	−0.0103*	−0.0934***	−0.1061***	−0.1066***
	(0.0025)	(0.0040)	(0.0028)	(0.0055)	(0.0063)	(0.0060)	(0.0061)
Black	−0.0269***	0.0154***	−0.0141***	0.0204***	−0.0985***	−0.0865***	−0.0875***
	(0.0021)	(0.0026)	(0.0034)	(0.0049)	(0.0059)	(0.0056)	(0.0057)
Other	−0.0048**	−0.0079**	−0.0092	−0.0178**	−0.0218***	−0.0201***	−0.0184**
	(0.0022)	(0.0035)	(0.0060)	(0.0082)	(0.0077)	(0.0074)	(0.0074)
Observations	1,016,488	990,830	990,830	990,830	897,603	897,603	897,603
R-squared	0.0179	0.1054	0.0319	0.0654	0.2597	0.3256	0.3888

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 16 RD estimates: party affiliation on labor markets, occupations more likely affected by gov. policies

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0068	0.0061	0.00094	0.00152	0.0013	0.0082	0.0105
	(0.0047)	(0.0039)	(0.0030)	(0.0059)	(0.0074)	(0.0084)	(0.0082)
Img-skilled×Dem	0.0228***	−0.0051	0.0212**	0.0204	0.0505***	0.0455***	0.0485***
	(0.0061)	(0.0064)	(0.0083)	(0.0126)	(0.0141)	(0.0147)	(0.0146)
Img-unskilled×Dem	0.0219***	0.0001	0.0017	0.0089	0.0524***	0.0500***	0.0504***
	(0.0051)	(0.0074)	(0.0053)	(0.0091)	(0.0157)	(0.0160)	(0.0151)
Black×Dem	0.0260***	0.0009	0.0235***	0.0306***	0.0535***	0.0522***	0.0553***
	(0.0045)	(0.0061)	(0.0066)	(0.0103)	(0.0138)	(0.0150)	(0.0144)
Other×Dem	0.0138**	−0.0026	0.0128*	0.0107	0.0250**	0.0195	0.0209
	(0.0053)	(0.0056)	(0.0073)	(0.0108)	(0.0109)	(0.0128)	(0.0126)
Img-skilled	−0.0002	0.0111	−0.0021	0.0090	−0.1293***	−0.1224***	−0.1258***
	(0.0046)	(0.0070)	(0.0039)	(0.0102)	(0.0172)	(0.0182)	(0.0183)
Img-unskilled	0.0235***	0.0121	0.0152***	0.0330***	−0.2337***	−0.2310***	−0.2294***
	(0.0044)	(0.0077)	(0.0030)	(0.0083)	(0.0203)	(0.0197)	(0.0191)
Black	−0.0454***	0.0142***	−0.0224***	−0.0133**	−0.0420**	−0.0324*	−0.0378**
	(0.0030)	(0.0032)	(0.0038)	(0.0063)	(0.0166)	(0.0171)	(0.0175)
Other	−0.0091**	0.0071**	−0.0083	−0.0024	−0.0424**	−0.0359	−0.0323
	(0.0039)	(0.0030)	(0.0053)	(0.0063)	(0.0195)	(0.0222)	(0.0215)
Observations	856,973	821,196	821,196	821,196	727,080	727,080	727,080
R-squared	0.0398	0.0927	0.0350	0.0841	0.2731	0.3056	0.3835

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. The sample includes construction, maintenance and repair, farming, food preparation and serving, personal care, health care, teaching, and assemblers & operators occupations. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img-skilled×Dem, Img-unskilled×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on skilled immigrants, unskilled immigrants, blacks and others, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 17 RD estimates: party affiliation on labor markets, occupations less likely affected by gov. policies

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	−0.0004	0.0048	−0.0002	0.0049	−0.0083	−0.0017	−0.0009
	(0.0022)	(0.0035)	(0.0024)	(0.0048)	(0.0056)	(0.0063)	(0.0062)
Img-skilled×Dem	0.0068**	0.0018	0.0112**	0.0128	−0.0001	0.0002	0.0007
	(0.0032)	(0.0069)	(0.0048)	(0.0097)	(0.0166)	(0.0182)	(0.0185)
Img-unskilled×Dem	0.0132***	0.0046	0.0336***	0.0420***	0.0038	−0.0029	0.0002
	(0.0045)	(0.0079)	(0.0050)	(0.0103)	(0.0229)	(0.0216)	(0.0206)
Black×Dem	0.0133***	−0.0011	0.0229***	0.0218**	−0.0137	−0.0162	−0.0157
	(0.0040)	(0.0065)	(0.0060)	(0.0096)	(0.0185)	(0.0190)	(0.0195)
Other×Dem	0.0103**	0.0086	0.0205**	0.0281***	−0.0207	−0.0181	−0.0167
	(0.0048)	(0.0061)	(0.0082)	(0.0082)	(0.0160)	(0.0164)	(0.0171)
Img-skilled	−0.0020	−0.0101***	−0.0078**	−0.0155**	−0.0911***	−0.0995***	−0.0987***
	(0.0024)	(0.0034)	(0.0031)	(0.0061)	(0.0104)	(0.0111)	(0.0112)
Img-unskilled	0.0034	−0.0110*	−0.0090**	−0.0174*	−0.2058***	−0.2132***	−0.2123***
	(0.0035)	(0.0064)	(0.0040)	(0.0087)	(0.0218)	(0.0241)	(0.0233)
Black	−0.0340***	−0.0009	−0.0231***	−0.0262***	−0.0839***	−0.0902***	−0.0897***
	(0.0032)	(0.0038)	(0.0035)	(0.0056)	(0.0066)	(0.0072)	(0.0072)
Other	−0.0038	−0.0164***	−0.0139***	−0.0310***	−0.0435**	−0.0289	−0.0279
	(0.0027)	(0.0025)	(0.0051)	(0.0076)	(0.0179)	(0.0186)	(0.0188)
Observations	863,839	840,793	840,793	840,793	740,880	740,880	740,880
R-squared	0.0207	0.1161	0.0399	0.1101	0.3201	0.3716	0.3991

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. The sample includes managers & CEOs, business & finance specialists, architects, engineers, scientists, technicians, sales specialists, and administrative support occupations. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img-skilled×Dem, Img-unskilled×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on skilled immigrants, unskilled immigrants, blacks and others, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 18 Robustness of RD Estimates: Using Second-Order Polynomials

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0019	0.0039	0.0015	0.0058	0.0019	0.0063	0.0069
	(0.0020)	(0.0026)	(0.0018)	(0.0040)	(0.0058)	(0.0066)	(0.0064)
Img×Dem	0.0148***	0.0013	0.0142***	0.0183**	0.0408***	0.0390***	0.0417***
	(0.0035)	(0.0052)	(0.0043)	(0.0082)	(0.0120)	(0.0125)	(0.0126)
Black×Dem	0.0190***	0.0017	0.0262***	0.0300***	0.0334**	0.0318**	0.0345**
	(0.0032)	(0.0056)	(0.0053)	(0.0094)	(0.0125)	(0.0140)	(0.0145)
Other×Dem	0.0116**	0.0055	0.0199***	0.0242***	0.0151	0.0148	0.0162
	(0.0049)	(0.0050)	(0.0062)	(0.0087)	(0.0134)	(0.0147)	(0.0151)
Img	0.0044	−0.0059	−0.0049**	−0.0078	−0.2000***	−0.2086***	−0.2058***
	(0.0034)	(0.0050)	(0.0023)	(0.0061)	(0.0187)	(0.0197)	(0.0191)
Black	−0.0417***	0.0048	−0.0255***	−0.0249***	−0.0547***	−0.0540***	−0.0582***
	(0.0022)	(0.0031)	(0.0032)	(0.0056)	(0.0151)	(0.0157)	(0.0155)
Other	−0.0075*	−0.0035*	−0.0118**	−0.0167**	−0.0833***	−0.0753***	−0.0704***
	(0.0040)	(0.0019)	(0.0055)	(0.0073)	(0.0217)	(0.0247)	(0.0246)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0331	0.0901	0.0383	0.0551	0.3080	0.3493	0.3221

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. em represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 19 Robustness of RD Estimates: Using Prime Age (20–55 Years Old) Group

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0018	0.0020	0.0030	0.0049	0.0019	0.0052	0.0056
	(0.0021)	(0.0026)	(0.0020)	(0.0041)	(0.0056)	(0.0064)	(0.0062)
Img×Dem	0.0150***	0.0023	0.0175***	0.0197**	0.0463***	0.0444***	0.0469***
	(0.0036)	(0.0050)	(0.0053)	(0.0086)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)	(0.0123)
Black×Dem	0.0186***	0.0017	0.0273***	0.0291***	0.0399***	0.0386***	0.0407***
	(0.0034)	(0.0053)	(0.0063)	(0.0096)	(0.0119)	(0.0133)	(0.0137)
Other×Dem	0.0114**	0.0058	0.0177**	0.0235**	0.0193	0.0202	0.0215
	(0.0049)	(0.0052)	(0.0074)	(0.0093)	(0.0125)	(0.0143)	(0.0146)
Img	0.0052	−0.0112**	−0.0041	−0.0153**	−0.2005***	−0.2128***	−0.2098***
	(0.0035)	(0.0049)	(0.0029)	(0.0063)	(0.0189)	(0.0194)	(0.0188)
Black	−0.0429***	0.0041	−0.0290***	−0.0248***	−0.0520***	−0.0518***	−0.0555***
	(0.0024)	(0.0031)	(0.0043)	(0.0057)	(0.0148)	(0.0152)	(0.0150)
Other	−0.0086**	−0.0032	−0.0126*	−0.0158**	−0.0881***	−0.0809***	−0.0763***
	(0.0041)	(0.0020)	(0.0066)	(0.0072)	(0.0229)	(0.0256)	(0.0256)
Observations	1,500,676	1,450,772	1,450,772	1,450,772	1,312,731	1,312,731	1,312,731
R-squared	0.0327	0.0947	0.0343	0.0850	0.3082	0.3482	0.3221

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. em represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 20 Robustness of RD Estimates: Including Region-Specific Time Trends

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0018	0.0034	0.0021	0.0054	0.0033	0.0073	0.0079
	(0.0019)	(0.0026)	(0.0019)	(0.0040)	(0.0052)	(0.0061)	(0.0060)
Img×Dem	0.0147***	0.0009	0.0171***	0.0181**	0.0418***	0.0397***	0.0423***
	(0.0034)	(0.0052)	(0.0048)	(0.0082)	(0.0120)	(0.0126)	(0.0127)
Black×Dem	0.0188***	0.0010	0.0284***	0.0294***	0.0353***	0.0331**	0.0358**
	(0.0032)	(0.0053)	(0.0055)	(0.0090)	(0.0127)	(0.0141)	(0.0147)
Other×Dem	0.0116**	0.0055	0.0187***	0.0242***	0.0151	0.0148	0.0162
	(0.0048)	(0.0050)	(0.0065)	(0.0086)	(0.0133)	(0.0146)	(0.0151)
Img	0.0044	−0.0059	−0.0019	−0.0079	−0.1999***	−0.2085***	−0.2058***
	(0.0035)	(0.0050)	(0.0024)	(0.0061)	(0.0181)	(0.0193)	(0.0187)
Black	−0.0416***	0.004s9	−0.0297***	−0.0248***	−0.0550***	−0.0542***	−0.0584***
	(0.0022)	(0.0030)	(0.0040)	(0.0055)	(0.0151)	(0.0158)	(0.0155)
Other	−0.0075*	−0.0035*	−0.0132**	−0.0167**	−0.0833***	−0.0753***	−0.0704***
	(0.0040)	(0.0019)	(0.0063)	(0.0073)	(0.0216)	(0.0246)	(0.0245)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0331	0.1010	0.0410	0.0951	0.3088	0.3498	0.3226

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. em represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 21 Robustness of RD Estimates: Using After-Tax Income

Variable	Hourly income I	Weekly income II	Annual income III
Dem	0.0004	0.0046	0.0051
	(0.0068)	(0.0078)	(0.0077)
Img×Dem	0.0411***	0.0435***	0.0462***
	(0.0102)	(0.0117)	(0.0117)
Black×Dem	0.0336***	0.0355**	0.0386***
	(0.0115)	(0.0137)	(0.0141)
Other×Dem	0.0161	0.0170	0.0184
	(0.0131)	(0.0150)	(0.0154)
Img	−0.1716***	−0.1934***	−0.1912***
	(0.0166)	(0.0189)	(0.0183)
Black	−0.0681***	−0.0703***	−0.0746***
	(0.0142)	(0.0158)	(0.0155)
Other	−0.0836***	−0.0800***	−0.0754***
	(0.0195)	(0.0238)	(0.0236)
Observations	1,490,070	1,490,070	1,490,070
R-squared	0.2876	0.3318	0.3079

All dependent variables are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in equation (1). em represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 22 Robustness of RD Estimates: Including Additional Controls

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	−0.0003	0.0025	0.0028	0.0053	0.0047	0.0082	0.0092
	(0.0015)	(0.0026)	(0.0021)	(0.0036)	(0.0050)	(0.0061)	(0.0059)
Img×Dem	0.0162***	0.0002	0.0175***	0.0177**	0.0483***	0.0444***	0.0473***
	(0.0033)	(0.0053)	(0.0051)	(0.0084)	(0.0116)	(0.0122)	(0.0124)
Black×Dem	0.0207***	−0.0011	0.0294***	0.0282***	0.0369***	0.0322**	0.0353**
	(0.0029)	(0.0051)	(0.0060)	(0.0094)	(0.0124)	(0.0139)	(0.0145)
Other×Dem	0.0116***	0.0048	0.0175**	0.0222**	0.0130	0.0131	0.0147
	(0.0043)	(0.0054)	(0.0072)	(0.0096)	(0.0122)	(0.0135)	(0.0139)
Img	0.0039	−0.0054	−0.0026	−0.0080	−0.2041***	−0.2123***	−0.2093***
	(0.0032)	(0.0051)	(0.0023)	(0.0064)	(0.0187)	(0.0200)	(0.0194)
black	−0.0412***	0.0057*	−0.0306***	−0.0248***	−0.0550***	−0.0532***	−0.0573***
	(0.0024)	(0.0032)	(0.0041)	(0.0055)	(0.0157)	(0.0163)	(0.0160)
Other	−0.0071*	−0.0031	−0.0133*	−0.0164**	−0.0828***	−0.0763***	−0.0711***
	(0.0041)	(0.0020)	(0.0067)	(0.0076)	(0.0220)	(0.0251)	(0.0250)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0333	0.1010	0.0408	0.0949	0.3097	0.3507	0.3242

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. em represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. In addition all regressions include state-level unemployment rate, per capita income, a dummy for Democrats controlling state senate, and a dummy for a Democratic governor being in power in the previous term. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 23 Robustness of RD Estimates: Governors and Legislatures are from the Same Party

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0010	0.0044	0.0020	0.0064	0.0041	0.0090	0.0099
	(0.0020)	(0.0032)	(0.0022)	(0.0041)	(0.0059)	(0.0069)	(0.0067)
Img×Dem	0.0114***	0.0063	0.0146***	0.0209**	0.0325***	0.0325***	0.0353***
	(0.0041)	(0.0065)	(0.0053)	(0.0097)	(0.0121)	(0.0117)	(0.0115)
Black×Dem	0.0170***	0.0026	0.0237***	0.0262**	0.0424***	0.0397***	0.0433***
	(0.0039)	(0.0070)	(0.0058)	(0.0110)	(0.0145)	(0.0147)	(0.0144)
Other×Dem	0.0104**	0.0053	0.0171***	0.0223***	0.0215	0.0203	0.0221
	(0.0046)	(0.0058)	(0.0054)	(0.0074)	(0.0157)	(0.0174)	(0.0174)
Img	0.0059	−0.0104*	−0.0012	−0.0115	−0.2082***	−0.2203***	−0.2173***
	(0.0042)	(0.0058)	(0.0026)	(0.0071)	(0.0159)	(0.0158)	(0.0151)
Black	−0.0411***	0.0041	−0.0287***	−0.0246***	−0.0681***	−0.0680***	−0.0725***
	(0.0023)	(0.0037)	(0.0046)	(0.0062)	(0.0135)	(0.0141)	(0.0138)
Other	−0.0070*	−0.0043**	−0.0107*	−0.0150**	−0.1028***	−0.0975***	−0.0928***
	(0.0036)	(0.0020)	(0.0055)	(0.0066)	(0.0152)	(0.0173)	(0.0164)
Observations	805,008	776,543	776,543	776,543	697,383	697,383	697,383
R-squared	0.0335	0.1004	0.0411	0.0951	0.3124	0.3522	0.3234

All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects, time effects, and all other control variables (e.g., age, gender, marital status, and education) specified in Eq. 1. em represents the impact of Democratic governors on white natives. Img×Dem, Black×Dem and Other×Dem represents the impact of Democratic governors on immigrants, blacks and others relative to white natives, respectively. F(MV) is allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

Table 24 RD estimates: impact of party affiliation on labor markets over 1993–2013, all Covariates

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Dem	0.0028	0.0046	0.0034	0.0078	−0.0009	0.0055	0.0063
	(0.0029)	(0.0032)	(0.0022)	(0.0049)	(0.0059)	(0.0065)	(0.0063)
Img×Dem	0.0146***	0.0001	0.0162***	0.0136*	0.0409***	0.0391***	0.0417***
	(0.0035)	(0.0054)	(0.0047)	(0.0080)	(0.0120)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)
Black×Dem	0.0185***	−0.0005	0.0263***	0.0224**	0.0336**	0.0318**	0.0346**
	(0.0033)	(0.0056)	(0.0055)	(0.0087)	(0.0127)	(0.0141)	(0.0147)
Other×Dem	0.0115**	0.0046	0.0180***	0.0212**	0.0151	0.0148	0.0162
	(0.0049)	(0.0052)	(0.0064)	(0.0089)	(0.0135)	(0.0147)	(0.0151)
Img	0.0047	−0.0049	−0.0007	0.0043	−0.2001***	−0.2086***	−0.2058***
	(0.0034)	(0.0053)	(0.0023)	(0.0054)	(0.0187)	(0.0197)	(0.0190)
Black	−0.0414***	0.0059*	−0.0286***	−0.0090	−0.0548***	−0.0541***	−0.0583***
	(0.0022)	(0.0031)	(0.0039)	(0.0053)	(0.0151)	(0.0157)	(0.0155)
Other	−0.0076*	−0.0042**	−0.0138**	−0.0186***	−0.0834***	−0.0753***	−0.0704***
	(0.0040)	(0.0018)	(0.0060)	(0.0056)	(0.0217)	(0.0247)	(0.0246)
Age	0.0051***	0.0350***	0.0249***	0.0056***	0.0880***	0.3866***	0.3793***
	(0.0003)	(0.0007)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.0087)	(0.0130)	(0.0137)
Some college	0.0333***	−0.0135***	0.0259***	0.0102***	0.1979***	0.1852***	0.1835***
	(0.0015)	(0.0021)	(0.0018)	(0.0032)	(0.0071)	(0.0073)	(0.0074)
College	0.0483***	0.0377***	0.0433***	0.0968***	0.4835***	0.5070***	0.5059***
	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0015)	(0.0026)	(0.0110)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)
Advanced degree	0.0532***	0.0735***	0.0430***	0.1314***	0.7142***	0.7748***	0.7764***
	(0.0029)	(0.0019)	(0.0023)	(0.0036)	(0.0130)	(0.0133)	(0.0133)

Table 24 (continued)

Variable	Emp status I	Hours per week II	Total weeks III	Total hours IV	Hourly income V	Weekly income VI	Annual income VII
Female	0.0114***	−0.1588***	−0.0332***	−0.1910***	−0.2260***	−0.3470***	−0.3439***
	(0.0017)	(0.0043)	(0.0018)	(0.0045)	(0.0055)	(0.0080)	(0.0080)
Married	0.0297***	−0.0017	0.0269***	0.0672***	0.1235***	0.1155***	0.1143***
	(0.0008)	(0.0021)	(0.0013)	(0.0024)	(0.0025)	(0.0024)	(0.0022)
MV	−0.0000	−0.0000	−0.0000	−0.0000	0.0000	−0.0000	−0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
MV2	−0.0000	−0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000*	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
MV3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000***	0.0000*	0.0000*
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
MV×Dem	0.0000	−0.0000	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
MV2×Dem	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
MV3×Dem	−0.0000	−0.0000	−0.0000***	−0.0000**	−0.0000**	−0.0000*	−0.0000*
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Observations	1,720,812	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,661,989	1,491,826	1,491,826	1,491,826
R-squared	0.0325	0.0903	0.0357	0.0588	0.3087	0.3496	0.3224

Table 24 replicates Table 15 but presents coefficients for all covariates, except state and year fixed effects. All dependent variables but "Emp Status" are in logs. All regressions include state fixed effects and time effects, as specified in Eq. 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors based on clustering data at state level; ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Sources: the data draws on the CPS March samples from IPUMS for the survey years 1994–2014

References

Alesina A, Baqir R, Easterly W (1999) Public goods and ethnic divisions. Q J Econ 114:1234–84

Alt JE, Lowry RC (2000) A dynamic model of state budget outcomes under divided partisan government. J Polit 62(4):1035–69

Auerbach A, Gorodnichenko Y (2012) Measuring the output responses to fiscal policy. Amer Econo J Econ Policy 4:1–27

Autor DH, Katz LF, Kearney MS (2008) Trends in U.S. wage inequality: revising the revisionists. Rev Econ Stat 90:300–23

Beland L-P (2015) Political parties and labor market outcomes. Evidence from U.S. States. Amer Econ J Appl Econ 7:1–26

Beland L-P, Unel B (2017) Governors' part affiliation and unions. Indus Relat. Forthcoming

Beland L-P, Oloomi S (2017) Party affiliation and public spending: Evidence from US governors. Econ Inq 55(2):982–995

Besley T, Case A (1995) Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits. Q J Econ 110(3):769–798

Besley T, Case A (2003) Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States. J Econ Lit 41:7–73

Borjas G (2003) The labor demand curve is downward sloping: reexamining the impact of immigration on the labor market. Q J Econ 118:1335–74

Calonico S, Cattaneo MD, Titiunik R (2012) Robust data-driven inference in the regression-discontinuity design. Stata J 55:1–29

Card D (2001) Immigrant inflows, native outflows, and the local market impacts of higher immigration. J Labor Econ 19:22–64

Card D (2009) Immigrant and inequality. Amer Econ Rev Papers Proc 99:1–21

Cellini SR, Ferreira F, Rothstein J (2010) The value of school facility investments: evidence from a dynamic regression discontinuity design. Q J Econ 125:215–61

Caughey D, Sekhon JS (2011) Elections and the regression discontinuity design: lessons from close US house races, 1942–2008. Polit Anal 19:385–408

Congressional Budget Office (2013) A description of immigration population. Washington, DC: CBO

Cortes P (2008) The effect of low-skilled immigration on US prices: evidence from CPI data. J Polit Econ 116:381–422

Damm AP (2009) Determinants of recent immigrants location choices: quasi-experimental evidence. J Popul Econ 22(1):145–174

Dark TE (2001) The unions and the Democrats: an enduring alliance. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, United States

Fazzari SM, Morley J, Panovska I (2015) State-dependent effects of fiscal policy. Stud Nonlin Dyn Econom 19:285–315

Ferreira F, Gyourko J (2009) Do political parties matter? Evidence from U.S cities. Q J Econ 124(1):399–422

Garand JC (1988) Explaining government growth in the U.S. states. Amer Polit Sci Rev 82:837–849

Hemming R, Kell M, Selma M (2002) The effectiveness of fiscal policy on stimulating the economy. IMF Working Paper

Hunt J, Gauthier-Loiselle M (2010) How much does immigration boost innovation? Amer Econ J Macroecon 2:31–56

Hunt J, Gauthier-Loiselle M, Rachek Friedberg (1999) Immigrants and the receiving economies. In: Hirschman C, Kasinitz P, DeWind J (eds) Handbook of international migration: the American experience. Russell Sage Foundation

Imbens G, Kalyanaraman K (2012) Optimal bandwidth choice for the regression discontinuity estimator. Rev Econ Stud 79(3):933–959

Jensen JM, Beyle T (2003) Of footnotes, missing data, and lessons for 50-state data collection: the gubernatorial campaign finance data project, 1977–2001. State Polit Policy Q 3(2):203–214

King M, Ruggles S, Trent Alexander J, Flood S, Genadek K, Schroeder MB, Trampe B, Vick R (2010) Integrated public use microdata series, current population survey: version 3.0 [Machine-readable database]. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis

Knight B (2000) Supermajority voting requirements for tax increases: evidence from the states. J Public Econ 76:41–67

Lee DS (2008) Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S.: house elections. J Econ 142(2):675–697
Lee DS, Lemieux T (2010) Regression discontinuity designs in economics. J Econ Lit 48(2):281–355
Lee DS, Lemieux T (2014) Regression discontinuity designs in the social sciences. In: Best H, Wolf C (eds) Regression analysis and causal inference. Sage
Leip D (2015) Dave Leip's atlas of U.S. presidential elections. http://uselectionatlas.org
Lewis EG (2011) Immigration, skill mix, and capital skill complementarity. Q J Econ 126:1029–69
Mayda AM, Peri G, Steingress W (2015) Immigration to the US: a problem for the republicans or the democrats?
McCrary J (2008) Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: a density test. J Econ 142(2):698–714
McHenry P (2015) Immigration and the human capital of natives. J Human Resour 50:34–71
Moretti E, Butler MJ (2004) Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the U.S. house. Q J Econ 119(3):807–859
Ottaviano GIP, Peri G (2012) Rethinking the effects of immigration on wages. J Eur Econ Assoc 10:152–97
Peri G (2012) The effect of immigration on productivity: evidence from U.S. states. Rev Econ Stat 94:348–58
Petrocik JR (2009) Measuring party support: leaners are not independents. Elect Stud 28(4):562–72
Pettersson-Lidbom P (2008) Do parties matter for economic outcomes? A regression-discontinuity approach. J Eur Econ Assoc 6(5):1037–56
Preston I (2013) The effect of immigration on public finances. Technical Report, CReAM Discussion Paper
Razin A, Sadka E, Swagel P (2002) Tax burden and migration: a political economy theory and evidence. J Public Econ 85:167–90
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2014) Table 2.3.4. Price indexes for personal consumption expenditure by major type of product. BEA, Washington DC